Cuban Missile Crisis Research Paper Essay Research
Cuban Missile Crisis Research Paper Essay, Research Paper
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Cuban Missile Crisis Research Paper
The Cuban Missile Crisis was the closest the universe of all time came to atomic war. The United States armed forces were at their highest province of preparedness of all time, and Soviet field commanding officers in Cuba were prepared to utilize battlefield atomic arms to support the island if it was invaded.
In 1962, the Soviet Union was urgently behind the United States in the weaponries race. Soviet missiles were merely powerful plenty to be launched against Europe but U.S. missiles were capable of striking the full Soviet Union. In late April 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had the thought of puting intermediate-range missiles in Cuba. A deployment in Cuba would duplicate the Soviet strategic weaponries and supply a existent hindrance to a U.S. onslaught against the Soviet Union.
Meanwhile, Fidel Castro was looking for a manner to support his island state from an onslaught by the U.S. Ever since the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, Castro felt a 2nd onslaught was inevitable. He approved of Khrushchev & # 8217 ; s program to put missiles on the island.
For the United States, the crisis began on October 15, 1962 when reconnaissance exposure revealed Soviet missiles under building in Cuba. Kennedy organized the EX-COMM, a group of 12 advisers to manage the crisis. After seven yearss argument within the upper echelons of authorities, Kennedy concluded to enforce a naval quarantine around Cuba ; He wished to forestall the reaching of more Soviet violative arms on the island. On October 22, Kennedy announced the find of the missile installings to the populace and his determination to quarantine the island. He besides stated that any atomic missile launched from Cuba would be regarded as an onslaught on the United States by the Soviet Union and demanded that the Soviets remove their violative arms from Cuba.
Kennedy finally ordered low-level reconnaissance missions one time every two hours. On the twenty-fifth Kennedy pulled the quarantine line back and raised military preparedness to DEFCON 2. Then on the 26th EX-COMM heard from Khrushchev in a missive. He proposed taking Soviet missiles and forces if the U.S. would vouch non to occupy Cuba. October 27 was the worst twenty-four hours of the crisis. A U-2 was shot down over Cuba and EX-COMM received a 2nd missive from Khrushchev demanding the remotion of U.S. missiles in Turkey in exchange for Soviet missiles in Cuba. Attorney General Robert Kennedy suggested disregarding the 2nd missive and contacted Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to state him of the U.S. understanding with the first missive.
Tensions eventually began to ease on October 28 when Khrushchev announced that he would level the installings and return the missiles to the Soviet Union. Further dialogues were held to implement the October 28 understanding, including a United States demand that Soviet light bombers be removed from Cuba, and stipulating the conditions of United States to non occupy Cuba.
Causes of the Crisis
The Soviet determination to deploy missiles in Cuba can be broken down into two classs:
1 ) Soviet insecurity, and
2 ) the fright of losing Cuba in an invasion.
During his presidential run, Kennedy had repeatedly spoken of a missile spread between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Despite being briefed by the Pentagon that the U.S. had more missiles than the Soviets, Kennedy maintained his claim that the U.S. had less. In the summer of 1961 Khrushchev applied force per unit area to Berlin and finally built a wall environing West Berlin. In response, the Kennedy Administration felt it necessary to uncover to Khrushchev that there was in fact no missile spread. Khrushchev had ever known the U.S. had more missiles but now he knew that the Americans knew. Khrushchev besides knew that Soviet missiles were merely powerful plenty to be launched against Europe but U.S. missiles were capable of striking the full Soviet Union.
The second of the two major causes was Cuba & # 8217 ; s fright of invasion from the U.S. Since he had come to power in 1959, Fidel Castro was cognizant of several U.S. efforts to throw out him. First, was the failed Bay of Pigs invasion by CIA-backed Cuban expatriates in 1961. Second, was a U.S. military exercising in 1962. The Armed Forces conducted a mock invasion of a Caribbean island to subvert a fabricated dictator whose name, Ortsac, was Castro spelled backwards. The U.S. was outlining a program to occupy Cuba ( Operation Mongoose ) . The mock invasion and invasion program were devised to maintain Castro nervous. The CIA had besides been running covert operations throughout Cuba seeking to damage the Castro authorities. Consequently, Castro was convinced the U.S. was serious about occupying Cuba.
In April, 1962, Nikita Khrushchev had the thought of puting intermediate-range missiles in Cuba. A deployment in Cuba would duplicate the Soviet strategic armory and supply a existent hindrance to an U.S. onslaught against the Soviet Union or Cuba. Khrushchev promoted the KGB station head in Cuba Alexander Alexeev to Ambassador to negociate for Castro & # 8217 ; s blessing of the program. Believing it better to put on the line a great crisis than delay for an invasion, Castro accepted Khrushchev & # 8217 ; s offer. In July of 1962 the Soviet Union began its buildup of violative arms in Cuba.
The Secret Build-Up
Throughout the summer and autumn of 1962, the Soviets shipped launch equipment and forces necessary for the readying of missiles to Cuba. For fright of being discovered, they could non utilize military ships. Therefore civilian vass were used. In one case, military personnels rode on a sail line drive presenting as tourers. In all, 60 missiles and their payloads were transported to Cuba.
On August 10, 1962 John McCone, manager of the CIA, sent the president a memoranda saying that the Soviets would put medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. On the 29th, a U-2 reconnaissance flight over Cuba revealed the presence of SA-2 SAM sites. To reassure the populace, Kennedy announced on September 4 the presence of Soviet defensive missiles in Cuba, but that there were no violative arms. On the same twenty-four hours, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin assured Attorney General Robert Kennedy that no violative missiles would be placed in Cuba. Eleven yearss subsequently, nevertheless, the first Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles arrived. Under increasing force per unit area Kennedy ordered another U-2 flight over Cuba for October 9. Due to bad weather the flight was delayed until Sunday, October 14.
Day 1: Monday, October 15
After analysing the images from the flight, the National Photographic Interpretation Center found there were more surface-to-air missile sites, and six much larger missiles, each 60 to 65 pess long. They had discovered SS-4 atomic missiles.
Day 2: Tuesday, October 16
It was now clear that for months the Soviets had been lead oning America. Kennedy took charge and scheduled two meetings for that forenoon ; foremost, to see the exposure himself. The missiles he held in his sight had a scope of 1,100 stat mis and threatened major population centres in the U.S. including New York, Washington D.C. , and Philadelphia. At this point, the missiles were non yet operational, nor were they fitted with atomic payloads.
Kennedy hand-picked a group of sure authorities functionaries to rede him on the crisis. The assembled group was subsequently referred to as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council or EX-COMM. In that first meeting, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara outlined three possible classs of action for the U.S. to take against Cuba and the Soviet Union.
1. & # 8221 ; The political class of action. & # 8221 ; & # 8212 ; To prosecute Castro and Khrushchev on the diplomatic phase in a gamble to decide the crisis openly & # 8212 ; the option which most members of EX-COMM thought unlikely to win.
2. & # 8221 ; A class of action that would affect declaration of unfastened surveillance & # 8221 ; combined with & # 8220 ; a encirclement against violative arms come ining Cuba. & # 8221 ;
3. & # 8221 ; Military action directed against Cuba, get downing with an air onslaught against the missiles, & # 8221 ; and so followed by a invasion.
EX-COMM worked from the premiss that the missile payloads were non yet in Cuba and non attatched to the missiles. Therefore, the end of any action they proposed was to halt the payloads from making Cuba or to forestall the missiles from going to the full operational. What EX-COMM didn & # 8217 ; t cognize was that the Soviets did hold atomic payloads on the island. They had besides installed battlefield atomic arms in Cuba and were prepared to utilize them to halt an invasion.
Kennedy wanted to look tough yet avoid a military confrontation. No affair what action the U.S. took, EX-COMM expected Khrushchev to revenge.
Day 3: Wednesday, October 17
In order to keep secretiveness, Kennedy followed his planned agenda. The Soviets and the American public didn & # 8217 ; t cognize the Americans knew of the missiles in Cuba. If the Soviets found out, they might conceal the missiles or establish them if they were ready. If the populace found out, the state would panic. Consequently, Kennedy broke off no public battles for the following four yearss.
Throughout EX-COMM & # 8217 ; s treatments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Air Force strongly argued for an air work stoppage. The Air Force suggested bombing Cuba with over 100 sallies, Before the Air Force was done, they had planned a monolithic air onslaught that would hold wiped Cuba off the planet & # 8217 ; s surface.
After another U-2 flight on the dark of the 17th, the military discovered intermediate scope SS-5 atomic missiles. With the exclusion of Washington and Oregon, these missiles could make all of the Continental U.S.
Day 4: Thursday, October 18
On October 18 Kennedy fulfilled a antecedently scheduled battle to run into with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrie Gromyko. EX-COMM wasn & # 8217 ; t certain if Gromyko knew of the missiles or if he knew that the Americans knew. Kennedy decided non to face the curate on the issue.
The meeting began with a polite exchange over minor universe events but shortly shifted to Cuba. Gromyko read a statement to Kennedy stating that Soviet assistance was & # 8220 ; entirely for the intent of lending to the defence capablenesss of Cuba and to the development of its peaceable democracy. If it were otherwise, the Soviet authorities would hold ne’er become involved in rendering such assistance. & # 8221 ; In response Kennedy re-read a statement he had made on September 4 stating the U.S. would non digest violative arms in Cuba. Gromyko must hold wondered why Kennedy was reading him the statement, but when he subsequently reported to Khrushchev he said all was good with the Americans. After the meeting Kennedy remarked to an adviser that he wanted to take the hypertrophied reconnaissance photographs out of his desk, point to the missiles, and inquire Gromyko, & # 8220 ; What do these look like? & # 8221 ;
Subsequently that flushing, a semiformal dinner was held in Gromyko & # 8217 ; s award. As the invitees entered the State Department to go to the ball, EX-COMM was fixing to run into merely one floor below. During the treatment a bulk sentiment had been reached on urging a encirclement.
At the White House, Kennedy liked the thought of the encirclement because it provided the Soviets a manner out of the crisis. But because EX-COMM still hadn & # 8217 ; t reached a consensus Kennedy instructed his address author Theodore Sorensen to outline two different addresss to give to the American populace on October 22: one denoting a encirclement and the other denoting an air work stoppage. Kennedy still hadn & # 8217 ; T decided on the best class of action.
Day 5: Friday, October 19
Before go forthing for a run trip to the Midwest Kennedy met with the Joint Chiefs, who still promoted the thought of air work stoppages. A consensus still couldn & # 8217 ; t be reached. Kennedy was already late, so he asked his brother to go on the EX-COMM meetings to pull up full programs for both scenarios. Again he chose non to call off this trip because he wanted to keep secretiveness.
Day 6: Saturday, October 20
On Saturday, EX-COMM met to discourse the two addresss being prepared. They approved them with a few minor alterations and so Robert Kennedy called the President to state that he had to come back to Washington. It was necessary so, that he return and discourse with EX-COMM the two options: a & # 8220 ; surgical & # 8221 ; air work stoppage or a quarantine. The President eventually agreed. Canceling his trip by stating that he had an & # 8220 ; upper respiratory infection, & # 8221 ; he returned to Washington.
Between 1:30 and 2:30 p.m. he met with EX-COMM. Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, summed up Kennedy & # 8217 ; s picks: & # 8220 ; Basically, Mr. President, this is a pick between limited action and limitless action & # 8212 ; and most of us think it is better to get down with limited action. & # 8221 ; The President liked the thought of a encirclement because it allowed the U.S. to get down with minimum action and increase the force per unit area on the Soviets as needed. Kennedy would non finalise his determination until the following twenty-four hours.
Day 7: Sunday, October 21
On the 21st, Kennedy met with his top advisers to discourse the missiles in Cuba. He asked General Walter Sweeney, the caput of Strategic Air Command if an air work stoppage could destruct all the missiles. The General replied that they could take out all the missiles they knew approximately. Sweeney could non foretell 100 per centum success. Following, Kennedy asked the general how many casualties, civilian and military, would happen. The general responded, 10,000 to 20,000. The lone sensible option left was a encirclement against Cuba.
In the address Kennedy would give the state, he would utilize the word & # 8220 ; quarantine & # 8221 ; alternatively of & # 8220 ; blockade. & # 8221 ; This suggestion, made by George Ball, Under Secretary of State, was an of import 1. A encirclement, as defined under international pacts is an act of war. A quarantine, on the other manus, is simply an effort to maintain something unwanted out of a peculiar country. In amount, the U.S. could hold its encirclement but the international community would non see it an act of war.
The imperativeness contacted Kennedy to cognize about the state of affairs in Cuba. The imperativeness knew that there were violative arms in Cuba and that Kennedy was fixing a program to cover with the menace. Kennedy told the newsmans to be quiet. He even personally telephoned The Washington Post and the New York Times to inquire them to chant down their coverage of Cuba. He went on to warn that if he was denied the component of surprise, & # 8220 ; I don & # 8217 ; t cognize what the Soviets will do. & # 8221 ;
Another U-2 flight that twenty-four hours revealed bombers and Migs being quickly assembled and cruise missile sites being built on Cuba & # 8217 ; s northern shore.
Day 8: Monday, October 22
On Monday, readyings had to be made for Kennedy & # 8217 ; s 7:00 p.m. ( EST ) reference to the state. The State Department informed American Alliess around the universe of Kennedy & # 8217 ; s determination. U.S. Senate leaders were called to Washington for a particular briefing. They came out of the briefing doubting
the effectivity of a quarantine ; most wanted an air work stoppage. Almost 300 Navy ships set canvas, non yet holding received the specific orders for a quarantine. In Guantanamo Bay, three Marine battalions were brought in to reenforce the base and military dependants were evacuated. Military qui vive was raised to DEFCON 3 and instructions were given to be ready to launch missiles within proceedingss of the President’s address. Twenty planes armed with atomic bombs were besides in the air ready to strike the U.S.S.R.
At 7:00 p.m. , exactly as Kennedy was get downing his address, jet combatants took off from bases in Florida and headed south towards Cuba. If Castro decided to react militarily, they would be ready. For the following 17 proceedingss, Americans and citizens around the universe sat glued to their Television sets listening to the American President.
Earlier in the twenty-four hours, Kennedy had sent Khrushchev a transcript of his address. Upon reading it, Khrushchev became angered. He was angry with his military for non successfully concealing the missiles and he was angered by the American & # 8220 ; quarantine & # 8221 ; which, no affair what they called it, was an act of war. Khrushchev & # 8217 ; s first response was to teach the ships on their manner to Cuba non to halt.
In response to Kennedy & # 8217 ; s speech Castro mobilized all of Cuba & # 8217 ; s military forces. The Cuban & # 8217 ; s were non surprised by Kennedy, for the U.S. had invariably threatened them. Ever since the Bay of Pigs, 18 months before, the Cubans had been populating under a changeless fright of invasion. The & # 8220 ; Crisis of October & # 8221 ; was small different from any other month. The public stage had begun.
Day 9: Tuesday, October 23
Kennedy ordered six Crusader jets to wing a low-level reconnaissance mission. The mission was flown at 350 pess and at 350 knots and brought back stupefying close-up images of the missile sites and besides showed that the Soviets were proving the missiles for launch.
The Organization of American States ( OAS ) approved of the quarantine against Cuba. These states realized that they were besides threatened by the missiles in Cuba. With the backup of the Western Hemisphere, Kennedy signed the existent Proclamation of Interdiction in the early eventide. The quarantine was to take consequence at 10:00 a.m. ( EST ) on October 24. By the terminal of the twenty-four hours U.S. ships had taken up place along the quarantine line, 800 stat mis from Cuba. They were instructed to utilize force to hold any ship that failed to halt at that line.
Late in the eventide, the President sent Robert Kennedy to the Soviet embassy to speak with Ambassador Dobrynin. Well before the crisis, the disposal had developed this channel of communicating with the U.S.S.R. It allowed both states to discourse affairs in private and softly. At 9:30 p.m. Robert Kennedy arrived at the embassy and proceeded to call on the carpet the Soviet embassador for holding lied to the United States about puting missiles in Cuba. He responded, that every bit far as he new, there were no violative arms at that place. Because communications were still at an infant phase so, Dobrynin had to name a Western Union telegraph station in Washington, which sent a motorcycle courier to pick up the overseas telegram. Dobrynin recalls pressing the courier to go back to the station with the extreme velocity.
Back at the White House, the President decided to give Khrushchev more clip and pulled the quarantine line back to 500 stat mis.
Day 10: Wednesday, October 24
On the 24th EX-COMM convened at 10:00 a.m. ( EST ) , the exact clip the encirclement began. Soviet ships kept coming nearer to the line. American ships were fixing to disenable them if they did non halt. The order given to the American ships was to first communicate with the Soviet vass ; so if they did non halt, the American & # 8217 ; s were to fire across their bow, and if they still did non halt, American ships were instructed to blow off the rudder in order to halt the ships.
Two of the major concerns during the EX-COMM meeting were the Soviet pigboats attach toing the vass and the possibility that Khrushchev had non had adequate clip to teach the ship captains on what they should make. At 10:25 EX-COMM received a message that the Soviet ships were turning back. Khrushchev was non ready to spread out the crisis by disputing the encirclement. This did non intend that the crisis was over.
Besides on Wednesday, military qui vive was raised to DEFCON 2, the highest degree of all time in U.S. history. The presentment, sent round the universe from Strategic Air Command central office, was intentionally left uncoded to allow the Soviets cognize merely how serious the Americans were.
That eventide, the White House received a 2nd missive from Khrushchev:
& # 8220 ; You, Mr. President, are non declaring a quarantine, but instead are progressing an ultimatum and threatening that if we do non give in to your demands you will utilize force & # 8230 ; . No Mr. President, I can non hold to this, and I think that in your ain bosom you recognize that I amcorrect. I am convinced that in my topographic point you would move the same manner.
Therefore the Soviet Government can non teach the captains of Soviet vass edge for Cuba to detect the orders of the American naval forces obstructing that Island & # 8230 ; . Naturally we will non merely be bystanders with respect to piratical Acts of the Apostless by American ships on the high seas. We will so be forced on our portion to take the steps we consider necessary and equal to protect our rights. We have everything necessary to make so. & # 8221 ;
Day 11: Thursday, October 25
On the 23rd, U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, had proposed a intermission in the crisis to Kennedy and Khrushchev. He suggested the Soviets stop transporting violative arms to Cuba for two or three hebdomads and in exchange the Americans would suspend the quarantine for the same length of clip. On the twenty-fifth Kennedy courteously turned down the offer because it allowed the Soviets to go on fixing the missiles that were already in Cuba.
Khrushchev received another correspondence from Kennedy which restated the United State & # 8217 ; s place. Kennedy was non traveling to endorse down. Still trying to avoid war, Kennedy had U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson confront the Soviets at the United Nations. When asked straight about the missiles, Soviet Ambassador Zorin refused to notice. Consequently, Stevenson showed the reconnaissance exposure of missile sites. The exposure were unmistakable grounds of the Soviet presence in Cuba.
A newspaper column written by influential journalist Walter Lippman was besides printed on Thursday. Lippman suggested a face-saving missile exchange. The Soviets would take their missiles from Cuba and the Americans would take their missiles from Turkey. Days before, EX-COMM had already begun to see this option and was presently researching the political effects. Government functionaries both in the United States and Soviet Union erroneously interpreted Lippman & # 8217 ; s article as a test balloon floated by the Kennedy disposal, which it was non.
At the stopping point of the 5:00 p.m. EX-COMM meeting, CIA Director McCone indicated that some of the missiles deployed in Cuba were now to the full operational.
Day 12: Friday, October 26
During the 10:00 ante meridiem EX-COMM meeting, Kennedy said that he believed the quarantine entirely could non coerce the Soviet authorities to take its violative arms from Cuba. A CIA study from that forenoon stated that there was no arrest in advancement in the development of the missile sites and another reconnaissance flight revealed the Soviets were besides trying to camouflage the missiles. Kennedy believed that merely an invasion or a trade ( for missiles in Turkey ) would now win. He besides agreed to heighten force per unit area by increasing the frequence of low-level flights over Cuba from twice per twenty-four hours to one time every two hours.
A Letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy arrived this twenty-four hours, at the White House at 6:00 p.m. but because it had to be translated, it came in four separate parts, the last of which arrived at 9:00 p.m. The missive was clearly an ardent entreaty, written by Khrushchev himself, to decide the crisis. Khrushchev proposed taking his missiles if Kennedy would publically denote ne’er to occupy Cuba. It read:
& # 8220 ; You and I should non now draw on the terminals of the rope in which you have tied a knot of war, because the harder you and I pull, the tighter the knot will go. And a clip may come when this knot is tied so tight that the individual who tied it is no longer capable of unbracing it, and so the knot will hold to be cut. What that would intend I need non explicate to you, because you yourself understand absolutely what dreaded forces our two states possess.
I propose we, for our portion, will declare that our ships edge for Cuba are non transporting any armaments. You will declare that the United States will non occupy Cuba with its military personnels and will non back up any other forces which might mean to occupy Cuba. Then the necessity of the presence of our military specializers in Cuba will disappear. & # 8221 ;
Day 13: Saturday, October 27
Saturday was the worst twenty-four hours of the crisis. One U-2 was shot down, another flew off class over Russia, a low-level reconnaissance mission was shot at over Cuba, and a 2nd, more demanding missive was received from Khrushchev.
First, a U-2 on a & # 8220 ; everyday air trying mission & # 8221 ; over western Alaska picked the incorrect star to voyage by and flew off class into Soviet air space. When he realized his error, the pilot instantly radioed for aid. The deliverance station operator was able to give him waies to turn his plane onto the right class. By that clip the Soviets had detected the U-2 and sent MiG combatants to stop the undercover agent plane. The Americans besides sent their F-102 combatants to supply screen for the U-2. The F-102s had been armed with atomic tipped air-to-air missiles. The U-2 left Soviet air infinite in clip and two combatant groups ne’er met.
Around noon, intelligence reached EX-COMM that a U-2 had been shot down over Cuba. Major Rudolph Anderson & # 8217 ; s descry plane was hit by a surface-to-air missile and crashed in the island & # 8217 ; s eastern jungle. EX-COMM interpreted the action as a planned escalation of the state of affairs by the Kremlin. The order to establish the missile did non come from Moscow. It was a Soviet commanding officer in Cuba who gave the bid. Khrushchev now worried that he had lost control of his forces.
EX-COMM had antecedently decided that if an American reconnaissance plane was downed, the Air Force would revenge by bombing the piquing site. Now that it had happened, the Joint Chiefs, who had been pressing for permission to bomb Cuba, pressed even harder.
The following event in that long twenty-four hours was a low-level reconnaissance mission flown by six F8U-1P Crusader jets. Two of the jets aborted the mission early due to mechanical jobs, but the staying four continued on their class. As the combatants passed over the San Cristobal and Sagua la Grande missile sites, Cuban land forces shot at the planes with anti-aircraft guns and little weaponries. One plane was hit by a 37mm shell but it returned safely. Earlier that forenoon, Castro lost his nervus and ordered his military personnels to fire at American aircraft. With each new flight the Americans were deriving valuable information for an invasion Castro believed to be merely 24 to 72 hours off.
A Pretty Good Topographic point
Fourth, at 11:03 ante meridiem a 2nd missive from Khrushchev arrived. This missive, officially written, was much more demanding. Some members of EX-COMM speculated that hard-liners had pressured Khrushchev to take a more aggressive place. The missive was besides publically broadcast in order to cut down communicating holds but the broadcast besides raised the bets. The two states no longer had the luxury of private dialogues Khrushchev & # 8217 ; s old proposal had non mentioned Turkey. Too much information on the crisis had already been leaked to the imperativeness. If the U.S. buckled under force per unit area and removed its missiles from Turkey, a NATO ally, the whole confederation could waver.
Fearing struggle, Kennedy couldn & # 8217 ; t demand more of Khrushchev. Fearing political force per unit area at place, he couldn & # 8217 ; t give in on the inquiry of Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Then, Robert Kennedy had an inspiration: why non disregard the 2nd missive and respond merely to the first? A long-shot, but it might work suggested Soviet specializer Llewellyn Thompson. To Kennedy, it seemed the lone feasible option left. Consequently, the President had Robert Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen draft a response. In 45 proceedingss they returned to the meeting. The commission so edited the proposal and approved it.
The Secret Deal
After the meeting adjourned, Kennedy called six work forces into the Oval Office for farther audience. The President informed them of the Attorney General & # 8217 ; s run intoing with Ambassador Dobrynin on the old eventide and asked for more suggestions on how to utilize this cherished channel of communicating. The group agreed to hold the Attorney General meet with Dobrynin once more to orally reenforce the proposal. Secretary Rusk besides suggested that Robert Kennedy propose a secret trade on the Jupiter missiles in Turkey.
At 7:45 that eventide, Dobrynin came to the Justice Department to run into with the Attorney General. Kennedy handed him a answer to Khrushchev & # 8217 ; s missive and so informed him of the secret trade. He gave confidences that the U.S. would softly take the Jupiters a few months after the crisis but warned they could non be portion of a public trade. Robert Kennedy besides imposed an ultimatum to Dobrynin. & # 8220 ; If you do non take those bases, we would take them. & # 8221 ; He concluded by stating a Soviet committedness was needed by tomorrow. Immediately after the meeting Dobrynin cabled Khrushchev to state him of the proposal and that the Attorney General had imposed a deadline for a response. The Soviets merely didn & # 8217 ; t cognize what that deadline was.
Meanwhile, at the petition of Secretary Rusk, John Scali met one time once more with Aleksandar Fomin. Rusk wanted Scali to happen out why Khrushchev had all of a sudden introduced the Jupiter missiles into the trade. When Scali met Fomin in an empty dance hall at the Statler Hotel, he exploded. Why, Scali demanded, had Khrushchev performed a flip-flop? Fomin muttered something about hapless communications. Scali, non satisfied with the reply, so accused Khrushchev of executing a & # 8220 ; stinking double-cross. & # 8221 ; The ABC News co-respondent, in the heat of the minute, so gave a warning he had no right in doing: & # 8220 ; American invasion of Cuba is merely hours off, & # 8221 ; said Scali. Fomin was profoundly impressed by the statement. After the two parted ways he went back to the Soviet embassy to describe the latest intelligence to Khrushchev, while Scali wrote a memoranda summing up the brush for EX-COMM.
At 8:05 p.m. Kennedy released his response to Khrushchev & # 8217 ; s latest proposal. It was given to the imperativeness to avoid any communications holds.
& # 8220 ; As I read your missive, the cardinal elements of your proposals & # 8211 ; which seem by and large acceptable as I understand them & # 8211 ; are as follows:
1.You would hold to take these arms