IO Essay Research Paper THE ISOUGHT PROBLEMWhat
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I-O Essay, Research Paper
THE IS-OUGHT PROBLEMWhat is the Is-Ought job? It is normally stated as the job ofwhether it is possible to deduce normative statements from descriptivestatements ; but to province the job at its most general degree, it isthe job of whether ANY moral statement can be literally true, andhence potentially cognizable. It is the job of whether there existany moral FACTS in precisely the same sense as there exist chemical facts, historical facts, or mathematical facts. Since libertarianism is a normative political theory, it is merely naturalto expect that great libertarian minds would cope with theIs-Ought job ; after all, if there are no moral facts to be known, so any normative theory would be senseless. It would be akinto a theory about unicorns. Of class even if the Is-Ought job weresolved, it would barely set up any peculiar moral philosophy ; work outing the Is-Ought job is a necessary status forlibertarian moral theory to be established, non a sufficient status. Interestingly, libertarian political philosophers have spent even moretime on the Is-Ought job than you would anticipate. Rand, among others, popularized the job. She surely stirred my initial involvement inthe inquiry, but I found her reply to be rather unsatisfactory. After several old ages of believing about the job, I now think that Ihave a really promising solution which I will soon expound.Now it is really widely believed that there are merely two beginnings ofknowledge: observation and deductive logical thinking. This is possibly one ofthe few premises shared by philosophers every bit diverse as Rand and Hume, though of course they put different spins on it. Now it is non excessively hardto show that IF these are the lone two beginnings of cognition, so moralknowledge is impossible. ( Of class, merely because we are totallyignorant about something, we could non deduce that the thing did notexist ; but, as with star divination, if a field is shown to hold no validmethods, so the cogency of the field itself falls into inquiry. ) So why can & # 8217 ; t observation output moral cognition? Simply put, no matterhow long you look at something, listen to it, smell it, gustatory sensation it, ortouch it, no moral decisions arise. That seems reasonably obvious, but ithas wide-reaching branchings. For suppose that we try to warrant amoral decision with deductive logical thinking. The job here is thatdeductive concluding simply shows that IF the premises are true, THEN theconclusions are true, WITHOUT ESTABLISHING WHETHER OR NOT THE PREMISESARE TRUE.Therefore, for a deductive statement to give a trueconclusion, we must cognize that the premises are true, and must thereforehave some non-deductive agencies of cognizing this if we are to avoid aninfinite reasoning backward. Normally, this is no job, since we can useobservation to set up the truth of the premises. But as we noted atthe beginning, moral decisions can & # 8217 ; t be reached by observation. But couldn & # 8217 ; t premises verified through observation coupled withdeductive concluding output a moral decision? I answer that they couldnot. As a general regulation, a deductive statement can merely make aconclusion within the basic capable affair of the premises. You can & # 8217 ; tstart with a premiss about geometry and broad up with a decision abouthistory ; nor can you take an historical premiss and give a geometricalconclusion. Deductive logical thinking may give new and interesting consequences, but non about a wholly distinguishable field of survey than that of yourinitial premises. So we seem to be in a quandary ; neither observation nor deductivereasoning can give moral cognition. Fortunately, the quandary isself-created by the initial premiss. If we take the premiss earnestly, we will detect that many NON-moral points are cognition besides fall intoquestion. Take, for three illustrations, the undermentioned propositions:1. Every consequence has a cause ; the same cause ever produces the sameeffect. 2. The statement ad hominem is a false belief. 3. 2+2=4Notice: all three are non-moral ; and none of them could be known merelythrough observation or deductive logical thinking. We certainly do non observeevery consequence and every cause, so conclude that they ever come inpairs. But neither do we infer the jurisprudence of cause-and-effect fromanother, more basic premiss. So excessively with the logical rule that theargument ad hominem is a false belief ; it is non that we learn it by
carefully gazing at it ; but neither is it the merchandise of a deductiveargument. Or to take the
final case, we don’t learn tha 2 and 2 mustalways make four by observing groupings of 2’s (though doing so mightsurely help us grasp the principle), nor by deducing it from anythingelse. But if we don’t learn any of these propositions by observation ordeductive reasoning, how do we learn them? I answer that the previousaccount of knowledge makes a critical sin of omission: it assumes thatdeductive, indirect use of reason is the entire faculty. I say thatthere is also DIRECT reason, which we may also call intellect orintuition. We use our direct reason when we simply turn our intellectsto a proposition and think about it as honestly and critically as wecan; and coupled with sufficient intelligence, SOMETIMES we canimmediately see the proposition under consideration is true or false. Thus, to validate the law of cause and effect, I turn my intellect tothe proposition and think about it to the best of my ability; andeventually its truth becomes evident. So too with the fallacy adhominem: I think about the fallacy, turning my intellect directly uponthe issue, and see that it is false. The same goes for 2+2=4. To sumup, the problem with the theory that all knowledge comes from eitherobservation or deductive reasoning is that it ignores the more basicfaculty of direct reason; and the best argument for this faculty ofdirect reason, besides the introspective one, is that unless we allowfor a faculty of direct reason, almost everything that we call knowledgeturns out to be unjustified. I’d call that a reductio ad absurdum if Iever saw one.Now how does this help solve the problem of moral knowledge? I claimthat SOME moral propositions are learned by means of direct reason. That is, we simply think about the propositions, turning our intellectsto them as honestly and critically as we can, and then sometimes weimmediately grasp their truth. For example: Consider the proposition”Murder is wrong.” Turn your intellect to it as honestly and criticallyas you are able. I claim that when I carry out this thought experiment,the wrongness of murder becomes evident to me. So too with other simplemoral propositions. When I wonder whether racism is wrong, or whetherHitler was a bad man, when I apply my direct reason to the problem, theanswer is all too clear. Now of course, it needn’t be the case that ALLmoral knowledge is direct. In fact, I could only learn that Hitler was a badman by the cooperative use of all of my faculties:1. Murder is wrong. (Premise supplied by direct reason.)2. Hitler was responsible for many murders. (Premise supplied byobservation of incriminating evidence, testimony, etc.)3. Someone who deliberately commits many wrong acts is a bad person. (Direct reason.)4. Therefore, Hitler was a bad man. (Deductive reason)The point is that for the argument to even get of the ground, directreason was necessary. It might be that direct reason supplies only atiny number of valid moral principles, from which valid conclusions mustbe deduced. My opinion is that the use of direct reason is morefrequent, but that is not the critical part of the theory. The criticalpart is the admission that we SOMETIMES use the faculty of direct reasonto come to know a moral proposition as literally true. –Now as I said at the outset, this theory is consistent with anysubstantive moral views. Nevertheless, it is peculiarly consonant withlibertarian moral theory. Why? Well, it is a common observation amonglibertarians that everyone follows libertarian principles in his or herprivate life; it is only where government is concerned that they grant amoral sanction to the initiation of force. And if you asked youraverage person why it was wrong to commit murders, or rob, or defraudothers, one popular answer would be: “That’s just common sense.” Indeedit is; the principle of non-initiation of force is just common sense;which is to say, that even the simplest mind, if ithonestly and critically turns itself to theproposition that it is wrong to use violence against peaceful persons, orrob them of what they have produced, can immediately grasp its truth. All that would then be required to establish libertarian moral theorywould be to couple this everyday insight of direct reason with thepremise, derived from observation, that governments habitually violatethe non-initiation of force principle, and then use deductive reason todraw the final inference that most, if not all, of what government doesis wrong and must be stopped at once.