The Abortion Act 1967
This are subject to provisions set by the amendment in S. 37 of the 1990 Act. The amendment in S. 37 (4)of The 1990 act introduces a statutory defence against the offence of child destruction in S. 1(1) of Infant life preservation act 1929,providing the termination of a pregnancy be carried out in accordance with S. 1 of The abortion act 1967 as amended by S. 37 of Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 c. 37. d) 1st August 1991 e) Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.
This was a proposals for the revision of the law on assisted reproduction and embryo research, titled Review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: proposals for revised legislation (including establishment of the Regulatory Authority for Tissue and Embryos). h) S. 1 of the 2008 Act changes S. 1 of the 1990 Act to ensure that the Act applies to all live human embryos regardless of the method of their creation, and also to all live human gametes (Human Sperm and Eggs.
Only $13.90 / page
Furthermore S. (1) of the 2008 Act defines embryo in broad terms, as a ‘live human embryo’ however the definition no longer assumes that an embryo can only be created by fertilization and therefore brings the term embryo up to date with technologies that have been developed since the 1990 Act i) S. 1 of
The 2008 act came into force on, 1 October 2009. j) Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (Commencement No. 2 and Transitional Provision) and (Commencement No. 1 Amendment) Order 2009/2232. k) R. (on the application of Quintavalle) v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. 2005] UKHL 28. l) Clashing symbols? Reconciling support for fathers and fatherless families after the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act 2008 m) Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust  Q. B. 1 n) S. 42 of the 2008 Act has made the provision for female civil partners into line with married couples.
Therefore a female civil partner, who conceives a child by donor insemination, is the mother of that child and her civil partner will automatically become other parent, unless however the other civil partner did not consent to the mother’s treatment. Also, S. 5 states where a woman conceived and gave birth to a child by virtue of Sections 42 and 43, no man is to be treated as the father of the child hence S. 42 and S. 43 will not affect who is to be considered the parent of a child. o) T v B  EWHC 1444 (Fam) p) The statutory interpretation of parents under the Children Act 1989 Sch. 1 was confined to biological parents and those who had become parents by operation of the law pursuant to the ss. 42-45 of the 2008 Act however these provisions did not broaden the scope for purposes of imposing financial obligations.
Thus Sections 42 to 45 did not apply in this case. q) Lesbian Mothers in dispute TVB 1203 (Fam. Law 2010, 40(Nov), 1203-1206) ? r) Royal College of Nursing of United Kingdom v DHSS (1981) AC 800 HL The Royal College of Nursing disputed a Department of Health and Social Security statement that it was not an offence under Britain’s 1967 Abortion Act for nurses to terminate a pregnancy by medical induction if a doctor decided on the termination, initiated it, and remained responsible for it.
The House of Lords then ruled that, since the intent of the 1967 Act was to broaden the grounds on which abortions might be lawfully obtained as part of ordinary medical care, nurses participating in pregnancy termination were protected under the Act provided that a physician prescribed the treatment, remained in charge, and accepted responsibility throughout the procedure. s) British Pregnancy Advisory Service v Secretary of State for Health  A. C. D. 66. t) The argument in the case was not successful and thus declaration not granted. u) Medical abortion and the “golden rule” of statutory interpretation.
The case was U v Centre for Reproductive Medicine  EWCA Civ 565 Mr and Mrs U were attempting to overcome the effects of his earlier vasectomy so as to enable them to produce a child. The means adopted was surgical retrieval of his sperm which was then to be used in an IVF procedure involving Mrs U. Before the process was started, Mr U completed two consent forms. One was that of the centre itself, relating to storage and disposal of sperm, which contained a statement that it was the ‘ethical policy of this unit not to perform posthumous insemination’.
The other form was that required by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 which Mr U completed by choosing to authorize, in the event of his death, the continued storage of his sperm for use in an IVF procedure by his wife. On 25 October 2000, subsequent to the extraction of his sperm, Mr U and his wife had a treatment planning meeting with Ms Hinks, a specialist nursing sister at the centre, at which the consent form was altered by Mr U so as to allow his sperm to perish in the event of his death and withdrawing his consent to their continued storage for the purpose of fertilization.
The couple then progressed with the IVF programme, which was unsuccessful in establishing a pregnancy. Before they could try again, Mr U died unexpectedly. The centre brought proceedings seeking clarification as to what it should do with Mr U’s sperm. In light of his amendments to the consent form, it was an offence under s. 41(2) of the Act for the centre to continue storing Mr U’s gametes. Mrs U appealed on the basis that her husband’s initial consent to this course of action had not been validly retracted by the amendments made since those were tainted by the undue influence of Ms Hinks.
Comment on Reproductive Ethics (CORE) argued that the HFEA had exceeded the bounds of the authority accorded it under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (the 1990 Act). Specifically, the HFEA’s claim that PGD and HLA tissue typing could be licensed as a practice which was ‘for the purpose of assisting women to carry children’ being ‘designed … to determine whether embryos are suitable [to be placed in a woman]’.
CORE’s argument in the House of Lords was that ‘suitable’ in this context must mean capable of becoming a healthy child who is free of abnormalities. Any broader construction taking account of the wishes of Mrs Hashmi as to a future child’s particular characteristics, would pave the way for the creation of ‘designer babies’ chosen on the basis of such characteristics as hair and eye colour.
The HFEA argued for a broader understanding of ‘suitable’, suggesting that Mrs Hashmi would be entitled to regard an embryo as unsuitable unless it was both free of abnormality and a perfect blood match for Zain. While Maurice Kay J in the High Court found for CORE and a narrow interpretation of ‘suitable’, both the Court of Appeal and House of Lords found unanimously that the HFEA was acting within its powers in allowing Mrs Hashmi to go ahead based upon.
The licensing of the selection of IVF embryos has been left open by the legislation, following anticipation of PGD in the Warnock Report and White Paper 2) The HEFA 1990 prohibits specific activities, however it gave discretion for the Authority to deal with ethical issues (such as the one in this case). 3) If legislature had felt that a licence for selection would result in unethical practice it had the power to add to the list of S. 3 prohibitions by regulations, but did not.